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In assessing the consequences of modern war the economic history of Eastern
Europe in the post World War II period is extremely significant. Five years after the
end of World War II, it is Eastern Europe which has experienced the swiftest evo-
lution in economic form. In varying degrees, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria have shifted from capitalistic to communistic
economies. Behind this transformation was the impetus of World War II. The
Russian revolution, itself, it should not be forgotten, occurred in the late stages of
World War I. No symposium dealing with modern problems of war claims would
seem complete without some discussion of modern war damage in its most gen-
eralized sense, i.e., the loosening and weakening of the basic economic structure of
modern societies under the pounding of military and economic warfare and the
revisionist policies of enemy occupations. The lesson of Eastern Europe is that
economic reform is tremendously accelerated, nationalization ensues, and, given
political pressures.generating, from within a destroyed or injured economy, and
simultaneously asserted from without, the form of the society is transformed.
Thus neither the legal, economic, nor political aspects of war damage to property
can, in our time, be fully isolated or considered in a vacuum. Compensation for
damage is, of course, the touchstone of the legal approach. War damage may have
occurred on such a scale that compensation in the conventional sense cannot be
practically entertained. Compensation, as an economic device for restoring econo-
mies, may be rejected by governments in the face of overwhelming compulsions to
adopt alternative solutions. In the circumstances of World War II, given the magni-
tude of the injuries and wrongs to private individuals, the thoroughgoing over-
hauling of property rights perpetrated by the Nazi occupants of Eastern Europe,'
and the uniform policies adopted in the liberation and reconstruction period of x945-
1947, "war damage" moves away from "war claims" and merges with the funda-
mental political considerations of the economics of reconstruction. It cannot be
divorced from the post-war reorientation of views concerning property rights
and relations. Thus Poland and Czechoslovakia, facing similar problems of post-
war reconstruction, quickly recognized the oneness of property rights, political
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' See RAPHAEL LEMK5N, Axis RULE IN OcCUPIED EuROPE 36-49 (1944). "Social philosophers and
statesmen must watch carefully the phenomenon of the destruction of the institution of private property
in Europe in the present war, which may become even more extensive if the war is prolonged and may
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WAR DAMAGE AND NATiONALIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
orientation, and economic planning. In the large they were considered aspects of
one problem. This was true of the countries of Eastern Europe whether or not they
were "enemy" or "allied" during World War II. Although faced by certain legal
consequences of their participation in World War II, Rumania, Hungary, and
Bulgaria, as enemy states, were faced with the same problem, and, it is worthy of
note, progressed to the same basic communistic forms as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Yugoslavia, allied states in the same war.
In this very broad context of war damage-namely, the destruction of property
rights as well as physical property by the Nazis-more important, at the outset, than
the physical reconstruction of war damaged properties was the governmental need'
to disentangle property rights, undo forced transfers of property compelled by the
Nazi occupiers, and reestablish some semblance of property relationship more con-
sistent with the political viewpoints of the liberated governments. The fact that
the tides of many properties could not be restored because the former owners or their
heirs were dead or missing faced the returning governments immediately. The
fact that collaborators had succeeded, through Nazi intervention, to large holdings
of properties also faced the liberated governments who could not, for obvious reasons,
permit such holdings to be maintained. A vast aggregation of property rights in
Nazi persons or governmental instrumentaliies-a form of looting-necessitated
divesting and redistribution of the property in the interests of the new governments.
The forced evacuation of important areas in Czechoslovakia through the expulsion
of the Sudeten Germans3 presented to the Czechoslovak government, headed by
Dr. Benes, the problem of redistribution or state ownership of land and faced it with
difficult questions as to whether and how new property rights were to be established.
Similarly, in Poland, the administration of large areas of Eastern Germany conferred
upon the new Poland through the Potsdam and Yalta agreements4 presented to the
early democratic Polish government the problem of how and under what circum-
stances to redistribute the land and the properties of this wealthy area, or to set up
state ownership and control, after forcing the evacuation of the German inhabitants.
New territorial accretions to Yugoslavia' involved similar considerations of popula-
tion and property.
In situations such as these, evolving from World War II, and, in the context of
this discussion, best considered as in the nature of reparation on a governmental level
I Compare INTER-ALLIED DECLARATION AGAINST AcTs or DISPOSSESSIoN COMMITTED IN TERRITORIES
UNDER ENEMY OCCUPATION AND CONTROL, 'MISCELLANEOUS No. i (London, 1943).
3 See Chapter XII, Protocol of the Proceedings, Aug. I, 1945, The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, as
contained in A DECADE oF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1941-49, SEN. Doc. No. 123, 81st Cong., ist Sess.
(x949). "The Three Governments, having considered the question in all of its aspects, recognize that
the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements, thereof, remaining in Poland, Czecho-
slovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken." rd. at 45.
'Id. at 43-44. For Protocol of Proceedings, The Crimean (Yalta) Conference, Feb. 4-1I, 1945, see
id. at 31. About 40,000 square miles of Eastern Germany territory was placed under the administra-
tion of the Polish state; five to six million Germans were evacuated.
5 See Section IV, Treaty of Peace with Italy, 1947 (Dep't State Pub. 2743, European Series 2X).
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for war damages, the new governments faced the necessity of intervening with
respect to the property rights of individuals in the paramount interests of public
order, security, and restoration of occupation economies on a new basis. Uniformly,
both as to new territories and as to former territories under Nazi or puppet occupa-
tion, liberated governments, of necessity, assumed the initial role of Administrator
or sequestrator of property rights, as the case might be. Presumably, this was a
form of trust in which the eventual form of the property rights could follow the
course of either economic necessity or political pressure. In fact it followed the course
of both. The firm pre-war relationships of property tides and rights had been
drastically modified by the.Nazi occupants to an unparalleled degree in the history of
modern war. The end of the occupations and the withdrawal or evacuation of the
Nazis and their collaborators from the territories and properties which they had
seized or held, immediately loosened the entire structure of property rights in the
territories of the Eastern European countries.. The state intervened of economic
necessity and perpetuated the process for political reasons. It is the purpose of this
discussion to trace this development in some of its more important forms in the
legislation of three of the Eastern European states-Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Yugoslavia.
The beginning of the process was liberation and the end of the Nazi-Fascist
domination; the end was the total nationalization of the economies of the liberated
countries. It is fair to state that in terms of the economic consequences of war this
is the most significant of all of the results of that struggle. While the omnipresent
Soviet power in Eastern Europe facilitated the eventual establishment of communist
governments in the Eastern European countries," it is, of course, notable that the
restored governments, with the exception of Yugoslavia, were not at the outset wholly
communist. There was in the beginning, in I945, the pervasive spirit of the Pots-
dam Agreement. Yet the economic need for intervention by the state in property
rights faced the early governments and forced its accomplishment. Agrarian reform
as a policy of government had existed in varying degrees of implementation in all
of the Eastern European countries prior to ,'World War II. Distribution of the land.
while slow and frequently ineffectual, had nevertheless been commenced after
World War I. This slow pre-war agrarian reform received enormous impetus in
Poland and Czechoslovakia under the early post-war political coloration of these
then democratically orientated countries. If the law of a state is determined by its
economics, it is significant that without exception the laws of the liberated demo-
cratic governments provided, directly or indirectly, for large measures of state inter-
vention, ownership, and control.' It is suggested that the Soviet Government, as-
a Dates of Communist ascendancy to power are as follows: Rumania, March 6, 1945; Yugoslavia,
January 30, 1946; Bulgaria, July-November, 1946; Poland, February 6, 1947; Hungary, June 1, 1947;
Czechoslovakia, February 25, 1949.
7 Doman, Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, 48 COL. L. REv. 1125, 1126 (1948).
'See as to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, Sections II-V, infra.
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suning its desire to see communist governments in Eastern Europe, could not have
failed to recognize that the inevitable consequence of the economic pressure for
state intervention in countries that had been looted, corrupted, damaged, or de-
stroyed by the Wehrmacht and the Nazi occupations and collaborators would be
(were Soviet political and military pressure asserted at the proper times) the conver-
sion of private enterprise and capitalistic forms, in the Eastern European states, to the
economic sine qua non of a communist society-the total nationalization of the basic
productive property of the state and the severe curtailment of virtually all property
rights as they are known in Western states. It is permissible to wonder whether,
to some degree, the early post-war experience of the Eastern European states did
not remind the Soviets of Kerensky's brief experience, after World War hostilities
ended in Russia, and prior to the Soviet seizure of power.
Total nationalization as it finally materialized in the Eastern European countries
after World War II showed in its very form and nature the nexus with what, in its
most generalized form, has been referred to in this discussion as "war damage."
A generalized analysis of the basic principles and similarities of the eventual national-
ization measures in Eastern Europe is made later herein? To the extent that Eastern
European nationalizations differ from their best known historical predecessor, the
Soviet nationalizations after the October Revolution of 1917, they reflect the differ-
ences between World War I and World War II. Thirty years of Russian experience
with both the political and economic consequences of total nationalization had
intervened. It has been noted that agrarian reform had made measures of progress
in Eastern non-communist countries in those thirty years. Measures of socialization
and economic reform which, in all instances, fell short of total nationalization had
occurred in Western European countries and in the United States in the I93O's as a
consequence of the Great Depression. Socialization of some sectors of the economy
had occurred in both the Nazi and Fascist regimes of the 1930's. But an important
historical difference between the nationalization movements in the Eastern European
countries and the Soviet nationalizations after World War I was the degree of
acceptance by the Western states of post-World War II nationalizations. It is, of
course, true that after the onset of the so-called "cold war," political resistance de-
veloped in the United States and elsewhere to the extension of nationalization in
the Eastern European countries under the later communist regimes. A great differ-
ence, however, was that the post-World War II nationalization process was, at the
outset, not considered as revolutionary but recognized, even by the friends of pri-
vate enterprise, as probably economically necessary and politically unobjectionable.
Thus, as will be seen, many measures in Czechoslovakia, later extended and accel-
erated by the communists, were launched, with full acceptance by the Western
powers, under the early Benes regime.' Nationalization was gradualistic, stemming
' Nationalization is treated in this article largely in terms of the relationship of "compensation" Ind
"capacity to pay."
10 See Section III, infra.
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step by step from pre-World War II beginnings, to war damage, enemy occupation,
and post-war reconstruction. In this gradual process would the role of the state be,
at some point, inhibited, restrained, or reversed in favor of private enterprise?
This was one of the deeply perplexing questions which were asked in the early
discussions which led eventually to the formulation and adoption of the Marshall
Plan. It was recognized, in the pre-Marshall Plan period, that under the influence
of Soviet power and pressure, and without outside economic aid, most of the
European countries might be forced to carry through to total nationalization. It
developed that the course which each country would take after the terrible cost of
lWorld War II, would, in large measure, be determined by whether or not the
country joined the Marshall Plan program. The Eastern European countries did
not. Their path led from the damage of the war to total nationalization, and thu;
the course of their economies became interwoven with political decision. In this
view of the matter, what to do about "war damage" was governed by political as
well as economic decisions. But the legal theory was also of great importance.
Law mixes with politics and economics in the formulation of basic problems
after military destruction in modern war. Lawyers representing the interests of
property holders consider war damage to be a compensable wrong committed against
the property holder. Legal thinking, in such a context, is immediately concerned
with the problem of compensation for property loss which, when the war damage is
sufficiently extensive, becomes, for an economy, a mixed problem of law and eco-
nomics. This is also true of property loss suffered by virtue of nationalization or
takings by the state. Some consideration of the manner in which the Eastern
European countries looked and look upon the problem of compensation is thus highly
relevant.
Soviet legal doctrine after World War I, although somewhat modified by the
concessions to private enterprise made by Lenin, did not recognize that there was an
obligation to pay compensation for the value of property expropriated or nationalized
by the Soviet government. n Internally, compensation was afforded by the Soviets
to Soviet nationals in terms of social welfare rather than of legal obligation.' 2 Nor
is it clear, after thirty-three years, that the Soviets have at any time recognized that
there is an obligation under international law to pay just, adequate, and effective
compensation for the property of foreign nationals expropriated by the Soviet gov-
ernment. 3 This failure clearly to recognize an obligation to compensate lay at
the threshold of the non-recognition by the United States of the Soviet government
in the period 1917-1933. But after World War II there was no question of non-
recognition by the United States of the Eastern European governments on the score
"see Hazard, Soviet Property Law, 30 CORNELL L. Q. 466 (1945), for discussion of the Soviet
theory.
" Compensation has been afforded as to property which Soviet law permits to remain in private
ownership but subject to state controls.
" See note I8, infra.
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of their nationalization programs. This recognition continues today14 under the
total nationalization programs of the communist regimes in those countries. While
the Soviets at various times discussed, on inter-governmental levels, the nationaliza-
tion claims of foreign nationals, so far as is known no settlement agreements of this
nature as between governments were ever reached. An agreement to settle such
claims, reached in the exchange of notes in the 1933 recognition of the Soviet gov-
ernment by the United States, resulted in negotiations which reached an impasse in
1935, and were never resumed.'5 Anglo-American legal thought could not, nor
cannot, comprehend the Soviet position that an act of confiscation or nationalization
without compensation was the restoration to the people of property stolen from thein
by their exploiters and not the stealing of property by the state from the people'
Failure to compensate foreign nationals affords diplomatic justification for chal-
lenging the action of nationalization' 6 In the Soviet view, compensation to foreign
nationals, if to be made at all, is in the interests of international economic relations
rather than in discharge of an obligation by the Soviet government under interna".
tional law.' 7  On this Soviet premise, compensation, if made at the inter-govern-
mental level, could only be in terms of economic quid pro quos between the govern-
ments involved. In return for voluntary- payment of compensation, the Soviets ex-
pected economic concessions.' In brief, the Soviets would pay if it proved to their
immediate economic advantage to pay.
The problem of compensation developed almost immediately in the nationaliza-
tion programs of the Eastern European countries after World War II. Oddly
enough for theory, the ultimate position of the Eastern European countries anfd of
the Soviet government after World lWar I proved identical. Compensation would
be paid as between governments provided economic concessions were given by the
government of the country whose nationals' property had been taken. The justifica-
tion, however, for this was not as the Soviets had put it, that there was no legal
obligation to pay. Eastern European countries recognized the legal obligation to
"' Diplomatic relations between the United States and Bulgaria were severed on February 2o, 1950.
'See ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATrIc RELATIONS WITH TiE UNION OF SOVIET SOcIALIsr REpuucs,
1933 (Dep't State, Eastern European Series, No. I). Under the so-called "Litvinoff Assignment" of
November 16, 1933, certain claims of the Soviet Government as successor to prior Governments of
Russia against American nationals were assigned to the United States "preparatory to a final settlement"
of claims and counterclaims between the two governments. There has been no "final settlement." Some
$7,0o0,00o has been collected by the United States pursuant to the "Litvinoff Assignment."
'" For a recent review of the authorities, see Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation: A Comparative
Approach, 17 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 458 (1950).
'On this the diplomatic documents published in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES:
1933 at 778-840 (Dep't State, 1949), are illuminating.
" As quid pro quo for the settlement of claims of the United States, the Soviets expected credits or
loans. The Soviets hoped to achieve two purposes: (I) propagandistic: to make payn*nts in an
indirect or disguised manner which would permit the Soviet Union to deny that it was recognizing
the validity of the nationalization claims of foreign nationals; and (2) economic: to obtain concessions
and terms from the United States which it would be impossible for other claimant governments to
extend to the Soviets thereby relieving the Soviets of the necessity of extending comity in claims settle-
ments to all foreign governments. See note 17, supra.
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pay'9 but justified the failure to pay compensation on the score of lack of capacity
to pay.' ° This lack of capacity to pay obviously stems from the premise of extensive
war damage in World War II and the generally recognized necessity of restoring
war damaged economies, given a condition of inadequate or partial war reparations
only. This recognition of the legal obligation to compensate, both as to the national-
izing country's own nationals and as to nationals of foreign countries, is an interest-
ing aspect of the gradualism after World War II. Local compensation remedies are
provided for, without exception, in the nationalization legislation of the Eastern
European countrics. It is doubtful whether these countries at any time realistically
expected that the nationals of foreign countries would take advantage, to any great
extent, of local remedies providing for compensation. In fact, the governments of
Western nationals investing in Eastern European countries, have not recoghized that
such remedies, and the relief afforded, satisfy the standards of justice under inter-
national law. Compensation has thus far been made in a framework of overall
settlements between governments. 2' The fact that such settlements have been made
after World War II and could not be made with the Soviet Union after SWorld War
I is some indication of the changing international viewpoint caused by economic de-
velopments between the two wars and by the nature of World War II itself. It
is significant, in evaluating the consequences of modern war, to note that not only
have Western countries, in the midst of the "cold war," settled nationalization
claims on mutually advantageous terms with Eastern European countries, but that
they have recognized the right of the Eastern European countries to nationalize and
gauge their obligations in terms of their capacity to pay. This acknowledgment that
the legal obligations of the Eastern European countries are to be tested fundamentally
by capacity to pay is, it is suggested, an outgrowth of the entire problem of recon-
struction and reparation after World War II.
It is doubtful whether capacity to pay would have become a key concept were
it not for the destruction caused by World 'War II. Capacity to pay, between states,
is a matter of meeting the recognized obligation to pay just, adequate, and effective
compensation.
Local remedies available under the legislation of the Eastern European countries
"s Thus as to Czechoslovakia, Paragraph 7 of Agreement on Commercial Policy Between the United
States of America and Czechoslovakia (Treaty Ser. 1569) effective November 14, 5946, provides: "The
Government of the United States and the Government of Czechoolovakia will make adequate and
effective compensation to nationals of one country with respect to their rights or interests in properties
vhich have been nationalized or requisitioned by the Government of the other country."
As .to Poland, see DEP'T STATE PRE.SS RELEASE No. 935 (Dec. 27, 1946).
" This position was always taken, as will be seen, when foreign governments insisted on compen.s-
tion other than in local currency.
"-- Examples: Belgian-Czechoslovak, November, 1949 (settlement fund accumulated by deducting per-
centage of payment for imports from Czechoslovakia); British-Czechoslovak, September, 1949 (install-
rmient compensation with simultaneous trade agreement); British-Yugoslav, December 23, 1948 (simul-
taneous trade agreement with schedules of imports and exports); United States-Yugoslav, July sg, 1948
(simultaneous unblocking of Yugoslav assets in the United States); French-Czechoslovak, August 6,
X948 (payment out of ciedit balance in favor of Czechoslovakia arising out of economic and financial
relations between the two countries).
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provide for payment in local currency or payment in long-term bonds redeemable
in local currency. 2 One of the consequences of World War II was the extension
of foreign exchange controls to almost all countries.23 Local currencies were uni-
versally blocked in the nationalizing countries. Foreign governments in espousing
the claims of their nationals arising out of the nationalization of property interests
contended that payment in local blocked currency did not constitute "effective"
compensation, since a totally nationalized economy did not permit of private rein-
vestment in the country and, accordingly, local currency was of no practical utility
to a foreign national, thereby making such "compensation" a nullity. The right
of a government to control its currency has been internationally recognized 24 and
has been a prime reason for diplomatic espousal of nationalization claims and a
stimulus to inter-governmental overall settlement. Inevitably, inter-governmental
negotiators must consider the question of the capacity to pay by the nationalizing
country, since the availability or non-availability of foreign exchange determines the
possibility of "effective" compensation. The right to block currencies is explicitly
recognized by the international community and the privilege of a country, whose
economic condition does not so warrant, to make payments in foreign exchange is
even curtailed by international agreement.2 5
The Eastern European countries have contended that the test of any obligation
under international law must be realistic; that no country should be expected to
meet an obligation which it is economically impossible for it to assume. The counter
argument has been that no state has an international right to take property with-
out providing prompt, adequate, and effective compensation and, given the absence
of such compensation, the taking is a nullity.2 The nationalizing countries have
claimed that the right of a state to expropriate property is an attribute of its sover-
eignty. The right of a state to block local currencies and otherwise engage in
financial controls is, it has been contended, also an attribute of sovereignty. The
simultaneous exercise of both powers nullifies neither. The requirement of "just,
adequate, and effective compensation" originated in a time of widespread private
property holdings and relatively limited property takings by the state. Such takings,
commanding "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation, were for police or
public welfare purposes-such as expropriation of property for highways, schools,
and the like. In such a period in the international community, the state was a
minor factor in property holdings and the private individual the major factor.
Accordingly, in the view of the Eastern European countries, the obligation to make
"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation was always correlative to a country's
"See Sections I-IV, infra.
"See FIRST ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTMICTIONS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUN (Marcb
1, 195o).
" Cf. Rubin, supra note 16, at 460-462.
" See Article 8, Section 2, ARTICES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND 28-67
(Dep't State Pub. No. 2187, Conf. Series 55, 1944).
2Hyde, Compensaod for Expropriation, 33 Am. J. INTL L. xo8, 112 (1939).
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capacity to pay or its capacity to raise the means of compensation by taxation or
negotiable credit instruments27 This, the Eastern European countries claimed,
they could not do on the basis of the established doctrine of compensation because
of the economic destruction and chaos caused by World War II and the "accelera-
tion of history" thereafter. Can any modern state, particularly a state badly damaged
by modern war, be required to pay prompt, adequate, and effective compensation to
all former property holders where, in the exercise of its public policy, it nationalizes
the entire economy? Did not the economic consequences of World War II make
nationalization a reasonable exercise of public policy? Assuming such a state, in
the exercise of its soverign power, establishes a basis of local currency payments
adequate to meet, over a long period of time, compensation obligations, is it obli-
gated to pay promptly in unblocked foreign exchange to foreign nationals? If the
nationalizing state has no capacity to make such payment, especially where large
scale foreign investment has existed on a pre-war basis and has been nationalized
on a post-war basis, is a foreign government warranted in insisting on such com-
pensation without entering into correlative and simultaneous economic agreements
.whereby through loans, credits, or agreed trade turnover it is made possible for the
nationalizing state to pay compensation in settlement? In brief, allied countries
during World IWar Il such as Czechoslovakia and Poland have taken the position
that the international obligation to pay can be implemented only if the government
insisting on the obligation makes it possible for the .nationalizing government to
pay. Could the United States, if it nationalized its, entire economy, pay "prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation" to all holders of private property in the United
States? An insistence upon the letter of the obligation in effect negated the inter-
national recognition of sovereign right to expropriate property. All inter-govern-
mental settlements for the nationalizing of property after World ,'War II, where the
East and West are involved, have been entered into on simultaneous conditions of
economic aid or specified trade relations between the compensating and the com-
pensated countries. 2s In thus posing the question of who "compensates" whom, the
Eastern European countries after World War II had, in practical effect, come very
close to the Soviet position after World War I. The outstanding difference between
World War I and World War II in this respect has been the recognition, by im-
portant countries of the West, of the practical logic of this position taken by Eastern
European countries.
Given the foregoing, the fact that lump-sum inter-governmental settlements
2T Cf. i L. F. L. OPasMM1M, INTEaRNaAONAL LAW 318 (6th ed., Lauterpacht, 1947). "The rule is
dearly established that a State is bound to respect the property of aliens. This rule is qualified, but not
abolished, by two factors: . ..The second modification must be recognized in cases in which funda-
mental changes in the political system and economic structure of the State or far-rbaching social
reforms entail interference, on a large scale, with private property. In such cases neither the principle
of absolute respect for alien private property nor rigid equality with the dispossessed nationals offer a
satisfactory solution of the difficulty. It is probable that, consistently with legal principle, such solution
must be sought in the granting of partial compensation."
"s See note 21, Supra.
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have been made by Eastern European countries is not surprising when to the factor
of concomitant economic concession there is added the factor of the property damage
of World War II. A lump-sum settlement is a negotiated settlement and does not
mean the payment of ioo per cent of the claims asserted or of their probable worth.
And apart from the obligation to pay and the capacity to pay, there are important
questions as to the values of the properties involved. A feature of war damage
in World War II is that the total extent of the later nationalization obligation is
minimized by reduction in valuations because of damage. Also, certain other
simultaneous large scale penal confiscations by the nationalizing country are, under.
recognized principles of law, not subject to compensation. In Eastern European
economic planning, if the amount of compensation payable for all properties taken
is greatly reduced because there is no obligation for penal confiscation, it may be
feasible to nationalize an entire economy. This is part of the pattern, it may be
observed, adopted by the Soviets in the post-Revolution takings of property -in the
Soviet Union. The legal distinction between confiscation and nationalization has.
important economic consequences in assessing the burden of compensation that the
state assumes to pay. To the extent that the state is free from the legal obligation
to pay compensation, and from the moral and propaganda onus in failing to dis-
charge its obligation, it is in a stronger position to operate a nationalized economy
totally "owned" by the state. The Eastern European countries, it is submitted, found
it possible to carry on nationalization programs, although assuming a burden of
compensation, because in addition to the facts that World War II had made it
cheaper to nationalize, and economic concessions and bargained reductions in cost
could be obtained in the post-war period, they had, through penal measures, con-
fiscated substantial amounts of property without an obligation to compensate.
In all of the Eastern European countries, and particularly in Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and Yugoslavia, the liberated governments confiscated property holdings as
penalties. As to this expropriation technique, the reported Nazi boast that whether
Germany won or lost the war, Europe would never be the same again, has peculiar
relevancy. The crimes set forth in immediate post-war legislation providing for
the confiscation of property as penalty are many and the property takings were of
far-ranging economic consequence.29 Because of the racial and other persecutions
of the Nazis, many properties were found abandoned, taken under the administra-
tion of the state, and never returned, or returned for occupancy only, under con-
ditions of nationalizationY' The takings of property held by Nazis or Nazi col-
laborators on penal grounds caused much economic wealth to fall in the hands of
the sequestrating state. The evacuation of German or Volksdeutche populations from
the territories of the liberated governments caused much property to come into the
ownership of the state. Post-war taxes levied for punitive reasons or because of the
cost of physical rehabilitation and reconstruction also caused property to revert to
"'See Secdons 1I-IV, infra.30 Ibid.
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the state. The value of the direct and indirect property takings of the Eastern
European countries under circumstances in which compensation was not legally
required by Western standards cannot be accurately stated but it is submitted that
the amount was substantial and that World War II not only furthered the economic
need for nationalization but, in a very real sense, the nature of the war and its
effect on property made it feasible for the state to commence total nationalization
programs without assuming burdens of impossible compensation.
In this respect, an analysis of some of the relevant war damage, restitution, penal,
and nationalization measures of three of the Eastern European countries-Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia-will afford illuminating insights.
Li: II
POLAND
The general principles discussed above may be considered in the light of the
sequence of laws, decrees, and regulations promulgated in and with respect to Poland
in the years 1944 to 1946. It should be noted that the legislation and the regulations
were enacted prior to the establishment of the present communist government in
Poland?'
On August 31, 1944, in promulgating a decree with respect to the administration
of punishment to Nazi criminals and to Polish traitors,"2 the Lublin Government
designated as criminals persons acting on behalf of the German occupation authorities
and prescribed as one of the penalties the confiscation of the entire property of the
guilty person. The decree encompassed all activities of such persons from August
31, 1939, on. Similarly, a decree issued on September 6, 1944,es relating to agrarian
reform, provided that apportionment of landed property without compensation
to the owners should be made of the property of "citizens of the German Reich and
Polish citizens of German nationality," of the property of persons guilty of treason
to the state or of giving assistance to the occupation forces, or of the property of
any person subject to the decree of August 31, 1944, referred to above. In a decree of
September 7, 1944.3' establishing housing commissions to adjust the housing ques-
tion because of war damage, destruction, and the necessity of mass resettlement,
housing commissions were directed to give particular consideration to the claims
of persons who acquired rights to houses before September I, 1939, and whose rights
were later set aside by the occupation authorities.
In a law, dated May 6, 1945," 5 regarding abandoned and deserted property, pro-
vision was made for the restitution of property in Poland both movable and fixed,
the possession of which was lost in connection with the war. It was provided, in
general, that restitution would be granted if possession was lost as the result of
"February 6, 1947.
s. Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, Decree No. r6.
"'Id. Decree No. 17. "Id. Decree No. r8.
" Id., Law No. 17, Item 97.
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abandonment, confiscation, agreement with the occupation authorities, or voluntary
transfer, if the transfer was made to preserve the property from loss in connection
with the war or the occupation. An Office of Temporary State Administration was
created to manage abandoned and deserted property3 6 Property of the German
state not yet taken over by the Polish state, or its organs, passed into the administra-
tion of the state? 7 A decree of March 8, 1946, provided a procedure for restitution
of property belonging to persons who lost possession during World War II. The
property of categories of Germans and others referred to in previous decrees would
not be restituted to previous owners3 8
In practice, from 1946 through 1949, persons attempting to assert rights under the
restitution decree of March 8, 1946, faced increasing difficulties. Restitution of prop-
erty rights to persecutees was hampered by the fact that many such claims involved
assets of persons killed in the ghettos or in the German concentration and extermi-
nation camps in Europe. Such persons, considering their large numbers, had
extensive property holdings in Poland; and considering the virtual extermination of
the Jewish population of Poland, attempts to gain tide to these properties, usually
required continuous search for relatives who might still be alive, and for death
records and other vital statistics records, many of which were destroyed during the
war. The obtaining of such necessary documentation involved considerable effort
and expense, which in practice was very possibly greater than the value of the prop-
erties if recovered, and accordingly, rights to restitution were abandoned and the
administration by the state resulted in property devolution to the state.
As time went on, restitution of property in Poland became less common, although
the legal right, under the March 8, 1946, decree, to such restitution existed, because
many of the small property holdings were, because of extensive war damage, re-
duced to only a fraction of their pre-war values. In many cases even if recovered
by the former owners they would be valueless. Most of the buildings which were
not completely destroyed during the war were damaged or suffered from pillage and
lack of upkeep?9 Heavy expenditures would have to be met for reconstruction
and repairs. Rentals were held at a low level by law and strict controls, and such
rentals in any event were taxed to such an extent that the balance left little to the
owners and was not sufficient to cover maintenance cost. Sales values became pro-
portionately small, and in any event, the proceeds could not be withdrawn from
Poland because of the currency restrictions established by Polish authorities. Ac-
cordingly, of the bulk of properties seized, confiscated, or acquired under forced
transfers by the Nazi occupants, little, in fact, was returned to the previous owners
on the pre-i939 basis.
Restitution of property to previous owners did not encompass property which
was either confiscated by Poland under previous decrees or nationalized by Poland
under the Act of January 3, 1946, referred to later herein. The likelihood of former
"Ch. IT. "-Art. 2, par. i. '* Art. 2.
"Robotnik (Warsaw), June 13, 1948.
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property owners asserting rights under the restitution decree would have been
enhanced had war damage compensation been paid. A war reparations bureau
attached to the Council of Ministries commenced registration of war damage by
issue of questionnaires returnable not later than April 1, 1947.40 While the ques-
tionnaire covered all possible types of war damage in a most detailed fashion, the
information gathered was considered to be for statistical purposes and did not insure
the payment of compensation by the Polish government. The entire question of
payment of compensation for war damage has been deferred, presumably until the
coming into effect of German and Austrian peace treaties containing reparations
provisions. Accordingly, as yet no compensation has been paid for war damage
suffered in Poland.
In the tabulation of war damage loss, persons injured were permitted to state
loss suffered because of personal damages, including among others, physical disability,
mental disability, loss of life of the head of the family, and moral losses (such as
national, racial, political persecutions). In connection with property losses, persons
were permitted to state household and personal property damage, loss of livestock
and vehicles, loss of real estate, and damage to industrial establishments, commercial
enterprises, and independent occupations. Other losses listed related to expulsion,
destruction, confiscation, and theft, non-payment of money due, losses in connection
with insurance and mortgage claims resulting from the destruction of real estate, lim-
itation of profits, and illegal deprivation of freedom. Provision was made, as to
each item, for a statement of the amount requested for indemnity.
Early in 1946 the Polish Provisional Parliament enacted a law41 nationalizing
Poland's key industries, "in order to restore the Polish national economy, to insure
the economic sovereignty of the state, and to improve the general standard of living."
The law provided for the taking over of enterprises on two bases, first, without com-
pdnsation,42 and secondly, subject to compensation4 The Polish Ministry of In-
dustry at the time of the promulgatiori of the law affirmed that the Polish Gov-
ernment had adopted the principle of compensation "although it burdens the whole
state and delays reconstruction."" The Minister of Industry stated, "I think I
represent the whole nation when I say that just compensation should be paid to such
an extent, in such form, conditions, and terms, that would not handicap the de-
velopment of our economy. 45
Categories of enterprises taken over, under the above law, by the state without
compensation, for penal reasons, included the following: (i) Those owned by
"0 Effective April 1, 1947, the Ministry of Public Information was assigned problems in connection
with damage which occurred on former Polish territory, the Ministry of Regained Territories was assigned
war damage problems on former German territory, and the Central Planning Board was assigned the
general problem as related to reparations and preparation of the German and Austrian treaties.
"Act of January 3, 1946, Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, No. 3, Item 17, effective
February 5, 1946.
'2 Art. 2. 'A Art. 3.
" Warsaw Radio, January 2, 1946, statement by Hilary Mine.
'See also, 15 DEP'T STATE Bus-L. 651, 653 (1946).
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the German Reich and the former Free State of ianzig. (2) Those owned by the
citizens of the above two states, excluding persons of Polish nationality or of other
nationality persecuted by the Germans. (3) Those owned by German or Danzig
legal persons excluding public bodies. (4) Those owned by companies controlled
theretofore by the German or Danzig citizens or by German or Danzig military
authorities. (5) Those owned by persons who fled to the enemy 6
In the light of the principle that compensation would be paid only to the extent
that it would not overburden the Polish economy, the effects of World War II
may be noted in the following economic factors to be taken into consideration under
the law: first, the general decrease of the value of the national assets as a result of
the war; second, the reduction in the value of the enterprise as a result of war and
occupation from September 1939 to the date of nationalization; and third, reduction
in compensation to the extent of investment in the enterprise after September I,
i939. 7 In the so-called "recovered territories" (East German territory placed under
Polish administration as the result of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements) an ag-
grandizement of the role of the Polish Government very naturally occurred. The
evacuation of the German population resulted in the establishment, by 1949, of almost
5,8oo state-owned farms in that area. In some i8 months, there were resettled in
the "recovered territories" over 3A million Poles from central and eastern Poland,
especially Poles from territories ceded to the Soviet Union.48 By the decree'of No-
vember 13, i946,49 a national levy was imposed on private individuals, cooperatives,
and state enterprises to raise some 13 billion zlotys for the reconstruction of the "re-
covered territories" by the Polish Government-i., repairing, on a governmental
basis, without recourse to private compensation.
III
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
World War II, for Czechoslovakia, is considered as having started on September
29, 1938, with the German invasion of the Sudetenland, and as having ended on
May i9, 1945, with the first Benes decree invalidating legal transactions under the
Nazi occupation." At the end of the war Czechoslovakia had suffered less physical
damage to property than the other Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, the
German occupations had taken over many Czech properties, including the two more
important banks and all of their assets. The Nazis had acquired large property
holdings through the confiscation of Jewish and foreign capital. Nazi collaborators
"Art. 2, sec. x, Act of January 3, 1946, supra note 4r.
"Art. 7, sec. 5.
'"Rzeczpospolita. (Warsaw), November -5, 1946.
"journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, No. 61, Item 34r.
Title: "On the invalidity of certain legal transactions concerning property, entered into during the
period of bondage; and on the State administration of property belonging to Germans and Hungarians,
traitors and collaborators, and certain organizations and institutions." 'Cone oi, LAws AND ORDiNANCE&
OF' THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIc, No. 5/45.
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had obtained large property holdings through forced transfers and the general pat-
tern of German indirect looting had been'carried on in a large scale.5 '
After the German surrender it was discovered that many enterprises crucial to
the operation of the Czech economy were without owners or managers. In many
instances management was taken over by workers' councils, later recognized by
Czech law providing for state control of so-called "masterless enterprises" formerly
owned by Germans, Hungarians, or Czech collaborators. 2 In a decree of May 19,
1945,' nullifying transfers of property, "entered into or undertaken under pressure
occasioned by enemy occupation or by national, racial or political persecution on or
after September 29, 1938," state administration was imposed on such properties
"wherever this is necessary and essential in the interest of the continuity of produc-
tion and economic life." In a Czechoslovak application of a principle which, as
has been seen, was applied in Poland, the Benes government decreed that the fol-
lowing categories of persons were "nationally unreliable" and their property placed
under state administration:
(i) Persons of German or Hungarian nationality.
(2) Persons who had engaged in activities generally understood to be
collaborationist.
.The decree listed a series of organizations in existence under the German occu-
pation, and membership by Czechs in such organizations was considered automat-
ically collaborationist." All companies and legal entities were considered to be
"nationally unreliable" if their condict furthered the German or Hungarian war
effort or "other Fascist or Nazi aims."5 Czechs were considered to be of "German
or Hungarian nationality" who "at any census of the population taken since 1929
declared to belong to the German or Hungarian nationality.""8 This would include
virtually all of the population of the pre-war Sudeten areas of Czechoslovakia. The
decree set up in detail the conditions under which state administration would
operate' and resulted in the placing of a significant portion of the Czech economy
-under state control by the Benes government.
This immediate sequestration was followed by a set of decrees confiscating prop.
erty outright and passing tide thereto to the state. Thus, on June 21, 1945, it was
decreed that all agricultural property owned by persons in the categories referred
to in the earlier decrees cited above was to be confiscated immediately without
compensation.58
It was provided that confiscated land would be administered by an agency of
government until the land was redistributed. 9 Likewise, in a decree of October
zlSee note i supra. x15 DEP'T STATE Buu.. 1027, 1928 (1946).
3 ibid. "ArL 4.
-"Art. 5. MArt. 6.
"
7 Art. 15 et seq.
as Presidential Decree No. 12. CODE OF LAW AND ORDINANCES oF r1E CzECuosLovAX REUB mic, No.
7/45.
" Art. 6.
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25, 1945,6° Dr. Benes extended similar confiscation to all propert with the excep-
tion of certain necessities like clothing, tools for trade purpose, et cetera.
In a law of May 16, 1946,61 the 1945 decrees were implemented by providing for
restitution of property rights held under state administration to "reliable persons in
the eyes of the state" who had claims based upon the deprivation of property rights
because of "the pressure of occupation or of national, racial or political persecution."
This right to restitution did not extend to "persons unreliable in the eyes of the
state," 62 a new category broader than mere "enemies of the state" referred to above.
In provisions for the presentation of claims against the state administrators of the
properties under the 1945 decrees, an important requirement was "legitimization"
of the claimant," i., proof that the claimant did not fall in the category of the
"unreliable." As will be seen, the distinction between the "reliable" and the "un-
reliable" was perpetuated in the nationalization legislation for purposes of com-
pensation.
Czechoslovakia, like Poland, commenced immediately, i.e., in August 1945, the
registration of war damage compensation claims. The provisions of decrees re-
quiring registration of war damages in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia"4 were broad
regarding the type of damages to be reported, including damage to health, real
and personal property, and earnings by any act of war or occupation or by local
Czechoslovak terrorist organizations.
Pursuant to the above decrees, laws were enacted which provided for preliminary
allotments to Czechoslovak citizens who were in absolute need or who needed
help to restore damaged property and buildings, or for a reduction in real estate
taxes. 6 However, like Poland, Czechoslovakia did not enact any law which spe-
cifically provided for rates of compensation to be paid for war damages. At the
most Czechoslovak war damage legislation provided for preliminary allotments
against a subsequent determination as to the amount of compensation to be granted.
The enactment of compensation legislation has not as yet taken place, presumably
on the theory that such legislation, if enacted at all, would be after the coming into
effect of the reparation provisions of German and Austrian peace treaties.
By a law of May i5, I946,"7 Czechoslovakia further adjusted the effects of
the Nazi occupation by providing for reporting to the state the status of virtually all
property in Czechoslovakia except state owned or administered. A detailed state-
ment was required of the nature of the property, and its history with respect to
increment or loss in value as the case might be, between January i, 1939 and No-
"' The definition of "enemy" also included Czechoslovak citizens who were of German or Hungarian
nationality.
"1 CODE OF LAwS A.D OaDINANCES OF "rHjE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, No. 55/46.62 Art. ,. 43 Art. 4.
04 COLLEcTION OF LAws AND ORDINANCES OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, No. 54/45.
"I1d. No. 161/46; No. 99/46.
"Id., No. 16l/46. Limited to a maximum of 25,00o kcs., Art. 6.
"'Id., No. 734/46.
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vember 15, i945.P Where the report showed an increase in property value, a severe
tax was placed on the increase in value.69
Two other phases of relevant Czech legislation are noteworthy as indicating the
parallel between Czechoslovakia and Poland. As has been seen, Czechoslovakia
confiscated virtually all agricultural holdings in the Sudeten portion of oWestern
Czechoslovakia. There commenced the forced migration of the divested popula-
tion to Western Germany. The redistribution of the land in these areas was ad-
ministered by local agricultural commissions under the direction of the Ministry of
Agriculture. This was, primarily, on the basis of colonization, somewhat similar
to that carried on in Poland, in which, among other persons, the Czech population
was resettled from territory ceded by Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union. Where
land was confiscated in Czechoslovak territory outside of the Sudeten regions,
landless workers and small farmers were given preference in the distribution. There
also commenced in the Sudeten on a scale unknown in pre-war Czechoslovakia
the organization of state-controlled farms. Thus began the genesis of the remark-
able expansion of state-owned farms which occurred in Czechoslovakia under the
communist government which came into power early in I948.10
There remains to consider the nationalization programs in Czechoslovakia which
commenced in October 1945 when the Benes government issued four decrees on
nationalization. The first decree71 covered almost all major industries such as
mining, power, iron and steel, chemicals, armament and munitions, paper, textiles,
and leather. Some of the industries, such as mining, power, iron and steel works,
and chemical industries, were totally nationalized. Other industries were subject
to certain limitations, the most important of which was the number of employees
in each individual plant. Enterprises with less than 150 employees were not affected
by the nationalization act. On the other hand, all plants employing on an average of
more than 500 persons were subject to nationalization. Certain listed enterprises of
200, 300, or 400 employees were specifically brought within the nationalization decree.
From time to time thereafter, other decress were promulgated nationalizing specific
plants under the decree of October 24, 1945.
The second nationalization decree concerned all banks,72 the third all private
insurance companies, a and the fourth covered the basic branches of the food in-
dustry.74 It should be noted that in the years which ensued after 1945, particularly
after-the communist coup of 1948, the area of nationalization was greatly extended.
At'the outset, however, the problem of compensation, formulated with due regard
to the over-all problem of capacity to pay, was handled in a manner similar to that
adopted in Poland. The theory of the Benes government was not modified to any
significant extent by the communist 'government in the later nationalizations of
SArt 2. 0 Art. 38. . Sece note .6 sqpra.
71 CODE OF LAWS AND ORDINANCES OF "tHE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, No. 00/45.
72Id., No. X02/45. 711d., No. 103/45. NO d.o, .. x/45.,
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1948. Two prime considerations of major interest in terms of this- article were in-
volved.
First, compensation was established at the current value of the property at the
time of the nationalization, after the deduction of liabilities. In arriving at the
amount of compensation, however, no weight was given to the value of unexploited
deposits of raw materials, mining rights, or property devoted to social, educational,
and similar purposes. The payment of compensation was to be in the form of
Government bonds or, in specified circumstances, cash or other values. The bonds
issued by the state for nationalized property were to be amortized by the excess
profits of national enterprises. The payment of interest and the amortization of the
bonds was guaranteed by the government.
Second, no compensation was to be paid under any circumstances for any national-
ized property which at the end of the occupation or later belonged to (I) the German
Reich, the Kingdom of Hungary, public persons under German or Hungarian law,
the Nazi and Hungarian political parties and related organizations, or German or
Hungarian corporations; (2) German and Hungarian nationals, except those loyal
to Czechoslovakia who participated in its fight for freedom or suffered under the
occupant; (3) natural persons who acted against the authority or unity of Czecho-
slovakia, its democratic republican form of government, or its safety and defense;
or who induced others to act in such ways; or who consciously supported the Ger-
man or Hungarian occupation authorities; or who earlier (during the period of
danger defined by law) promoted Germanization or Magyarization in Czechoslo-
vakia; or who acted against the interests of the Czechoslovak state or of the Czech
and Slovak nations; and (4) persons who had tolerated such activities on the part
of their business managers or had not exercised sufficient caution and good judg-
ment in the direction of such managers.
If, to the exclusion of the above categories from obligation to pay compensation,
there is added the fact that the Czechoslovak Governmnet resisted the payment of
compensation of any nature for the holdings of foreign nationals, in the absence
of compensatory economic concessions made by the governments of those nationals, 75
it will be seen how it became possible for Czechoslovakia, in terms of economic plan-




As in the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia, among the first formal acts of the
post-war government of Yugoslavia was a decree concerning the transfer to state
ownership of enemy property. This decree, effective February 6, 1945,76 transferred
to state ownership under the management of the state Administration of National
See note 21 supra.
Poltika (Belgrade), Nov. 22, 1944. Official Gazette, February 6, 1945.
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Property (i) all property of the German Reich and its citizens within Yugoslavia,
(2) all property of persons of German race (Volksdeutsche) except those who fought
in the National Army of Liberation or Partisan detachments, or those who were
citizens of neutral states and did not act as enemies during the occupation; and (3)
all property of war criminals and their accomplices without distinction as to nation-
ality, and all property of persons condemned by civil or military courts to loss
of property to the benefit of the state."7 In addition, administration in trust was
taken of property of absent persons who were carried off by enemy forces or fled
during the occupation, the property of whom had been transferred to third persons
under the pressure of, or by means of forced transfers accomplished by, the Nazi
occupation authorities. 7  This decree applied to all types of property and was ad-
ministered in conjunction with the basic collaboration law70 establishing various
defined acts under the occupation as crimes against the State.
In the latter law, effective September i, 1945, confiscation of property was among
the penalties for those who "economically collaborated with the enemy or occupation
authorities by placing their industrial, commercial, transportation or other enterprises
nr their expert knowledge at the disposal of the enemy for purposes of production
,r who themselves produced commodities strengthening the economic power and
war potential of the enemy.""0
Effective May 25, 1945, the war profits laws' provided for the seizure of war profits
acquired during the enemy occupation. It applied to any property held on May 9,
1945, over and above what Was possessed by the owner on April 6, 194r, and derived
from purchases or acts performed during that period.
Two agrarian reform laws82 enacted on August 5 and August 23, 1945, re-
spectively, limited the size of agricultural holdings in order to effect distribution of
land to peasants not actually engaged in agricultural pursuits. Large estates and
agricultural holdings of banks, enterprises, stock companies, and religious institutions
were confiscated without compensationP On August 16, 1945, a law on the abroga-
tion of mining privileges8 4 provided that all Yugoslav mines became the property of
the state.
So widespread in scope was the application of these penal measures, in which
confiscation, without compensation of property, was a common penalty, that even
prior to the promulgation of the new Yugoslav Constitution"" and the enactment of
nationalization laws, between 70 and 8o per cent of Yugoslav industry had passed
under state control by this method.s  With respect to industry, virtually all in-
7 Decree of November 2z, 1944, Art. ,. sArt. 2.
"Passed August 25, 1945. Official Gazette, September x, 1945.
"o Art. io. "Official Gazette, May 29, 1945.
82 Official Gazette, August 28, 1945..
" Art. 3, Law "on Agrarian Reform and Colonization.
- ,Poltika (Belgrade), August" r7, r945-.
85 Constitution of the Federative Peoples' Republic of Yugoslavia, approved by the Constituent
Assembly on January 31, 1946.
"6The Economist (London), January r9, z946:
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stances of sequestration of property resulted finally in formal confiscation or nation-
alization. As in Poland and Czechoslovakia, a restitution law, effective May 29,
1945,87 provided for the restoration of property seized from owners by the occu-
pants or their collaborators on racial, religious, national, or political grounds. All
holders of such property were required to turn the property over to the proper units
of the Administration of National Property. 8 Judicial remedies were provided
for the return of the property to the owner by the Administration." In the light
of the nationalization laws, which were subsequently enacted, and other economic and
tax measures, the amount of property so restored was not of great significance.
The nationalization measures were in two stages. Some 42 categories of private
enterprise were nationalized in a law effective December 7, 1946?' Unless a sentence
of confiscation had been pronounced against the owner, compensation was payable
in the form of government bonds, or, in some cases, in cash as of the value of the
net assets on the day the government took over the enterprise.91 As to property
sequestered prior to its nationalization, the value was taken as of the date the govern-
ment commenced to administer it?2 In April of 1948 an amendment to the basic
nationalization law extended the application of that law to virtually all remaining
enterprises in Yugoslavia?0 3
A letter addressed to the National Assembly of Yugoslavia by the President of
the Economic Council, submitting reasons for the 1948 supplementation of the
basic law on nationalization, throws light on a pattern which was pursued in all of
the Eastern European countries? 4 After stating that the proposed nationalization
extension would nationalize some 3,oo additional enterprises in Yugoslavia, the Presi-
dent of the Economic Council stated: "Henceforth there will no longer be in Yugo-
slavia industrial concerns which are not included within the social sector of our
economy." The letter then commented on the relationship of war damage and
nationalization as follows: ".. . the socialist sector of our economy germinated from
the confiscation of property belonging to peoples' enemies and war profiteers. These
confiscations did not come accidentally; they have not had a class background or
revolutionary character. They have not been accidental just as was not accidental
the national treason of the exploiting classes. . . . The confiscation of property
belonging to the peoples' enemies represents the first stage of the socialist sector of
our economy, because in the course of the struggle for the national liberation, pro-
found revolutionary social changes took place in our country."
Yugoslavia, in a decree of April io, I945,95 established a War Damage Commission
for the purpose of reporting and classifying war damages. The categories of war
87 Pollika (Belgrade), February X8, 1946. Law on Abandoned and Enemy-Alienated Property,
passed May 24, 1945.
13 Art. 2. 81 Art. 7-
0)Politika (Belgrade), December 6, 1946. "Arts. io and ii.
92 Art. 9. " Politika (Belgrade), April 29, 1948.
° Barba (Belgrade), April 29, 1948. "Official Gazette, No. 2o, April 'Io, 1945.
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damage were defined in extremely broad terms. 0  As yet no war damage com-
pensation legislation has been enacted in Yugloslavia and it is generally understood
that the registration was for the purpose of compiling a reparations account to be
utilized by Yugoslavia in connection with reparation provisions of World War II
peace treaties.
V
Certain implications may be drawn from the economic history of the post-war
years in Eastern Europe. These implications are of serious import and should be
considered by students of the economic and political consequences of modern war.
World War II demonstrated again that the structure of property rights and the
economic fabric of societies are greatly weakened by war. Europe as a whole, before
the Marshall Plan, faced a common problem of reconstruction and rehabilitation.
The Eastern European countries, taking the path of non-Marshall Plan participa-
tion, moved step by step to the ultimate logic of total nationalization. In the 1945
beginnings, the liberated governments assumed the roles of administrator or se-
questrator of economically significant properties pending reestablishment of the new
economy. An important element in national planning for greater state ownership
and control, where such ownership and control were deemed necessary for economic
stability, was ihe question of the restoration of the rights of former property holders
and the legal obligation to compensate. Clearly, conversion of economies from
private enterprise to national ownership, if pursued in accordance with traditional
principles of compensation, would entail prohibitive cost. The necessity of extend-
ing national ownership irrespective of cost dominated the economic thought of the
liberated governments, and this was met, in large degree, by utilizing on a large
scale the technique of confiscation without compensation. Superimposed on thii
technique were the policy of local compensation for nationalized property in long
term blocked currency obligations and the policy of resistance to the nationalization
claims of foreign nationals. Restitution legislation, the converse of confiscation legis-
lation, while necessary in theory to justify confiscation, proved of little practical mean-
ing in practice, given the necessity of large private expenditure for war damage repair
and heavy taxation, if return of the property were asked. Even as to the early non-
communist governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, large sectors of the economy
came under government ownership and control without compensation. Intermediate
stages of administration or sequestration for temporary purposes quickly merged
into state ownership or redistribution of property rights. 'When as a result of the
political pressures asserted by the Soviets, following the basic political decision not
to permit participation in the Marshall Plan, communist governments took over in
Poland and Czechoslovakia, the process of state ownership and control had already
far advanced due to the inexorable logic of the damage, disruption, and chaos caused
by World War II.
" Id., No. 44, June 26, 1945.
